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Abstract 
 
Learning rules are increasingly being used in macroeconomic models. However one 
criticism that has been levelled at this assumption is that the choice of variables for 
inclusion in the learning rule, and the actual specification of the learning rule itself, 
is arbitrary. In this paper we test how important the particular learning rule 
specification is by incorporating a battery of learning rules into a large-scale macro 
model. The model’s dynamics are then compared to those from a version of the 
model simulated under rational expectations (RE). The results indicate that although 
there are large differences between the RE solution and each of the solutions under 
learning, differences amongst the learning rule solutions are minor.  
 
 
JEL classification: C53, E43, F33 
Keywords: Learning, Rational expectations, Bounded expectations, Kalman Filter 




Since Lucas (1972, 1979) the dominant assumption in macroeconomics concerning 
the formation of agents’ expectations has been that they are rational. That is, agents 
make no systematic errors in their forecasts (i.e. the forecast error is white noise); the 
expected future value of a series is equal to the value predicted by the economic 
model, subject to a shock. This is seen by some to be a highly restrictive assumption, 
requiring that agents not only use all their information optimally, but more 
importantly that they have all the information that is required to forecast. Requiring 
agents to know everything that drives a particular system places large demands on 
agents with the information requirements seeming to be too high. For instance, this 
assumption requires that agents know all the equations’ functional forms, together 
with the processes that drive the shocks hitting the economy. As an alternative to the 
assumption of rational expectations, economists have begun experimenting with the 
hypothesis that agents learn about their economic environment over time. Under 
learning, agents do not know the true process that drives the expected values of a 
series so instead have a rule that they use to predict these future values. Each period 
as new information becomes available agents learn from their previous mistakes and 
improve their learning rule by updating the rule’s parameter values. Marcet and 
Sargent (1989) have shown that so long as the variables that enter this rule are 
correlated with the variables that actually drive the process determining the expected 
values, then the learning model may converge to the equilibrium that would have been 
obtained under RE. 
 
The attraction of learning then is that it allows agents to make mistakes in the short-
run, but not in the long-run. However learning has itself been criticised since the 
learning rule that the modeller chooses for the agents is arbitrary; no theory exists for 
why agents may choose or prefer one rule instead of another. For even a medium size 
model the set of available rules appears large, since every possible permutation of the 
variables could conceivably be included as the learning rule. So a fundamental 
question is how does an agent select one rule to use from the very wide range of 
alternatives. Might some rules dominate others such that the agent would never 
choose the dominated rule when others are available? A second important set of 
issues relates to the model’s dynamics under the various expectations assumptions, ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 6
how do they differ as we change between learning rules, and how is the RE solution 
related to the solutions obtained under the many learning rules?  
 
This paper begins by first attempting to understand how an agent might narrow down 
the set of rules that are available. The approach taken is first to ask how much of the 
information necessary for forecasting future values of a particular series can be 
obtained from a small subset of the remaining series and second, to what extent does 
the information contained in two series overlap for forecasting a third? Clearly, if two 
series contain the same information then there is no point in both series entering the 
learning rule. This will reduce the number of rules that the agent might choose to 
employ. It is desirable to obtain some measure of the amount of shared information in 
two series so that the number of potential rules can be eliminated in a systematic 
manner. 
 
To disentangle the contribution of each series to the agent’s information set, we 
follow the ideas set out in Collard and Juillard (2000). They build upon a recent 
contribution by Judd (1998), who argues that high order approximations for the 
expectation function may be needed when linearising stochastic optimal control 
models. Modellers have tended to limit themselves to first-order approximations 
because of the technical complexity thought to be required as one moves to a higher 
order. However Judd’s method is considerably simply than earlier contributions and 
allows a second-order approximation to be easily computed. A second-order 
approximation becomes extremely useful in our context since it allows us to measure 
the extent to which the co-variation between two series may contribute to explain the 
variables of interest. 
 
Having investigated a range of ways of selecting the learning rule and demonstrated 
that the learning rules gives very similar model properties over a very wide range of 
information sets we then investigate how these outcomes relate to the full RE 
outcome. We set up a weighted learning rule which combines the full RE expectation 
with the learning outcome and investigate the effect of moving from RE to learning. 
We find that a very small departure from RE moves the models properties very close 
to the range of learning solutions. This strongly suggests that RE is not representative 
of the models likely solution when agents are only weakly rational. A near RE 
solution such as learning then seems to be much more representative of the likely 
outcome for the model. 
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1 Introduction
Since Lucas (1971, 1972) the dominant assumption in macroeconomics concerning
the formation of agents’ expectations has been that they are rational. That is, agents
make no systematic errors in their forecasts (i.e. the forecast error is white noise); the
expected future value of a series is equal to the value predicted by the economic
model, subject to a shock. This is seen by some to be a highly restrictive assumption,
requiring that agents not only use all their information optimally, but more
importantly that they have all the information that is required to forecast. Requiring
agents to know everything that drives a particular system places large demands on
agents with the information requirements seeming too high. For instance, this
assumption requires that agents know all the equations’ functional forms, together
with the processes that drive the shocks hitting the economy. As an alternative to the
assumption of rational expectations (RE), economists have begun experimenting with
the hypothesis that agents learn about their economic environment over time. Under
learning, agents do not know the true process that drives the expected values of a
series so instead have a rule that they use to predict these future values. Each period
as new information becomes available agents learn from their previous mistakes and
improve their learning rule by updating the rule’s parameter values. Marcet and
Sargent (1989) have shown that so long as the variables that enter this rule are
correlated with the variables that actually drive the process determining the expected
values, then the learning model may converge to the equilibrium that would have be
obtained under RE.
The attraction of learning then is that it allows agents to make mistakes in the short-
run, but not in the  long-run. However learning has itself been criticised since the
learning rule that the modeller chooses for the agents is arbitrary; no theory exists for
why agents may choose or prefer one rule over another. For even a medium size
model the set of available rules appears large, since every possible permutation of theECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 8
variables could conceivably be included as the learning rule? So a fundamental
question is how does an agent select one rule to use from the very wide range of
alternatives. Might some rules dominate others such that the agent would never
choose the dominated rule when others are available? A second important set of
issues is how different is the outcome of a model as we change between learning rules
and how is the rational expectations(RE) solution related to the many learning rules.
So we might find that rational expectations is similar to the many learning rules or we
might find that the learning rules are all very similar but the rational model is
qualitatively different from all of them. This would be an important result as it would
suggest that the RE solution is not representative of a wide class of expectation
formation procedures but that it has very special properties. So the question we are
raising is does a small departure from full RE imply a big change in models properties
or are these properties broadly similar for a range of near rational behaviour.
In this paper we first attempt to understand how the agent might narrow down the set
of rules that are available. Our approach is to ask first, how much of the information
necessary for forecasting future values of a particular series can be obtained from a
small subset of the remaining series and second, to what extent does the information
contained in two series overlap for forecasting a third? Clearly, if two series contain
the same information then there is no point in both series entering a learning rule. This
will reduce the number of learning rules that the agent might choose to employ. Here
we want to obtain some measure of the amount of shared information in two series so
that the number of potential rules can be eliminated in a systematic manner.
To disentangle the contribution of each series to the agent’s information set, we
follow the ideas set out in Collard and Juillard (2000). They build upon a recent
contribution by Judd (1998), who argues that high order approximations for the
expectation function may be needed when  linearising stochastic optimal control
models. Modellers have tended to limit themselves to first-order approximations
because of the technical complexity thought to be required as one moves to a higher
order. However Judd’s method is considerably simply than earlier contributions and
allows a second-order approximation to be easily computed. A second-order
approximation becomes extremely useful in our context since it allows us to measureECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 9
the extent to which the co-variation between two series may contribute to explain the
variables of interest.
Having investigated a range of ways of selecting the learning rule and demonstrated
that the learning rules give very similar model properties over a very wide range of
information sets we then investigate how these outcomes relate to the full RE
outcome. We set up a weighted learning rule which combines the full RE expectation
with the learning outcome and investigate the effect of moving from full RE to full
learning. We find that a very small departure from full RE moves the  models
properties very close to the range of learning solutions. This strongly suggests that RE
is not representative of the models likely solution when agents are only weakly
rational. A near RE solution such as learning then seems to be much more
representative of the likely outcome for the model.
In the next section the theoretical framework is outlined. Section 3 discusses the ideas
contained in Collard and  Juillard, Section 4 presents the model with the results
discussed in Section 5. In all of these results the benchmark against which the
different learning rules are measured is the path that would have been obtained under
RE. As an alternative, Section 6 compares the results to those from a very simple
learning rule. Section 7 asks how much rationality is required in the learning rule for
the model’s properties to equal those from a model that assumes rational expectations.
Section 8 concludes.
2 The Theoretical Framework
To gain some understanding of the contribution of learning to a model’s solution and
its dynamic behavior, the differences between learning and rational expectations can
best be illustrated in a simple analytical model. Here, the cobweb model of Muth
(1961) is used.
The cobweb model is a useful workhorse for studying the effects of learning and RE
since supply is assumed to be a function of the expected price (plus additional
exogenous terms), while demand is simply a function of the current price,
s
t t t t
s
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All parameters are positively signed. The first equation relates the quantity supplied
of the good (q
s) to the previous periods expectation (Et-1) of the price (p) this period,
some additional exogenous terms (w) assumed to be white noise, plus an error term
also assumed to be white noise (u
s). Quantity demanded of the good (q
d) is simply a
function of the current price and a further white noise error.
The contribution of Muth (1961) was to assume that agents do not make systematic
errors. They must therefore not only use the information they have efficiently but also
use all available and relevant information. In the above context this requires that
agents know both of the equations that drive prices and quantities. Assuming quantity
supplied equals quantity demanded (q
s = q
d), the reduced form is given by
t t t t t u w p E p + + + = - - 1 2 1 1 b b g (1)
where  4 0 /a a g = ,  4 1 1 /a a b - = ,  4 2 2 /a a b - = , and  4 / ) ( a
s d u u u - =  (note that
â1<0). Under RE it has to be the case that in equilibrium the expected price is the
realised price (Et-1pt=pt). Substituting this expression back into the reduced form (1)
gives,
t t t w p e k k + + = -1 1 0
where  ) 1 /( 1 0 b g k - = ,  ) 1 /( 2 1 b g k - =  and  ) 1 /( 2 b e - =u . Under RE then,
1 1 0 1 - - + = t t t w p E k k .
Incorporating learning into a model requires specifying the process by which agents
actually learn. Here it is assumed that learning follows a statistical approach.
Statistical learning is interesting since agents are treated as econometricians and like
econometricians agents use past observations to make their best forecast of future
realizations, updating their prediction rule depending upon the forecast error. Bray
and Savin (1986) and Fourgeaud, Gourieroux and Pradel (1986) take the “cobweb”
model and ask if agents would learn the RE solution over time. Suppose agents
believe that prices evolve as follows,
t t t w p e k k + + = -1 1 0 (2)
which is of the same form as the RE equilibrium, but where ê0 and ê 1 are unknown.
Agents are required to act like econometricians and estimate these parameters byECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 11
regressing pt on wt-1 and an intercept term using the historical data and a method of
estimation such as least squares. Agents’ forecasts would then be,
1 1 1 1 0 1 - - - - + = t t t t t w p E k k (3)
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Equations (1), (3) and (4) now form a fully specified dynamic system. The question
asked by these authors is: will ( 1 0 - t k ,  1 1 - t k )’ ￿ ( 1 0 - t k , 1 1 - t k )’ as t ￿  ¥? They find
that so long as â1 is less than one, convergence is guaranteed. This condition always
holds so long as the demand and supply curves have their usual slopes. The term E-
stability is also useful here. An E-equilibrium exists if after repeatedly substituting
into the actual process governing the model’s evolution the perceived process, a fixed
point is eventually reached where the expected process equals the actual process. In
terms of the above system, an E-equilibrium exists so long as â1 is less than one. The
model is also said to be E-stable.
3 Which Learning Rule?
Specifying the particular learning rule used by agents can be an arbitrary exercise.
The decision on which variables should be included is not straightforward even in
small analytical models that have few variables. But it is much more difficult in the
type of large-scale econometric models used by policymakers for forecasting and
simulation exercises. These models may have over 500 variables and be highly non-
linear. It is clearly impractical for all the variables to enter the learning rule, but how
does the modeller decide which variables do enter, and how sensitive are the results to
the chosen learning rule? Garratt and Hall (1997) provide an answer to the second
question using the London Business School’s econometric model. Expectations can
enter these models in many areas, but it is in the exchange rate sector where they have
been shown to have the largest effect. Typically expectations have been introduced
via a forward-looking open arbitrage (nominal) exchange rate equation. Since it is a
nominal variable, the easiest way to introduce a shock has been to shock an
exogenous price, usually the world price of oil. In a small model it is straightforward
to test if a stable equilibrium exists, the system’s  eigenvalues simply requireECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 12
computing. In large models it is more difficult since the eigenvalues can only be
locally approximated. Garratt and Hall therefore concentrate on the evolution of the
learning parameters. If the parameters cease changing then this is evidence they argue
that the model has attained its equilibrium. Their results indicate that for four of the
five rules they test (and where each rule is chosen in a totally arbitrary way) there is
clear evidence of convergence, though for the final rule a longer simulation period
would be required before convergence could be confirmed. Overall, it is argued that
the large-scale model used is E-stable.
The authors then go on to ask how the dynamic paths of inflation and output are
altered in response to the different rules. Again for four of the five rules the dynamic
response of output is remarkably similar – at the end of the simulation they all predict
that output is 3% lower following the oil price shock. The fifth rule does not appear to
have converged. Garratt and Hall therefore conclude that where convergence does
occur, the same end period values for output results for a range of learning rules. The
length of the period required for learning seems to be in the order of five years.
However, if the endpoints are similar the dynamic paths are not, so the form of the
learning rule is important for the model’s trajectory. Overall, Garratt and Hall show
that dynamic responses, stability, and end-value solutions can be affected by the
choice of learning rule. More significantly, their approach can be seen as offering a
way of deciding between different forms of the general learning rule, by recourse to
their stability and other dynamic properties when used in a macro model. In this
sense, the paper is an illustration of one way to recover (identify) the form of the
learning rule that is being used – to take an extreme example, a rule which is not E-
stable, would be unusable eventually. That said, the procedure has limitations, the
most obvious one being that several versions of the learning rule appear E-stable, thus
it is difficult to choose between them on this criterion alone.
An entirely different approach, and the one used below, is to take the empirical
evidence to establish the likely determinants of the variable concerned, and form an
expectations rule based on this. We can refer to this as “estimating” the expectations
rule, but on the understanding that the term is used as shorthand only since it is not an
estimation approach. Instead, in the present context the essential idea is to establish
(estimate) the quantitatively most important exogenous determinants of for exampleECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 13
the expected exchange rate by the contribution these other series make to the
evolution of the exchange rate.
Collard and Juillard (1999) set out the essential principles, although their applications
are to small analytical models. Thus for the model
  )) , , , , , ( ( 1 1 1 - - + t t t t t t t u u x x y y f E (5)
where x are the weakly exogenous variables, u are stochastic shocks, y the variables
for which expectations are formed and for which there are a total of n equations. To
obtain an expression for the formation of expectations two functions linking variables
y and x to the shocks are postulated,
) , ( 1 t t t u x g y - = (6)
) , ( 1 t t t u x h x - = (7)
This enables us to write the expected value of  1 + t y  explicitly as
)]. ), , ( ( [ 1 1 1 + - + = t t t t t t u u x h g E y E (8)
In other words the conditional expectation given by (8) can be summarised as
)] , , ( [ ) , ( 1 1 1 + - - = t t t t t t u u x F E u x F (9)
where the function F is equal to the function g(h). Equations (5-9) are the basic set of
equations, but these are non-linear. They can be approximated however using Taylor
expansions around a deterministic equilibrium, as Collard and Juillard show. Thus for
the simplest, linear case the approximation for each of the equations in (9) is






m i i t A i u u F x x x F x F E F ￿ ￿ ¶ ¶ + - ¶ ¶ + = (10)
where the term in u t+1  is omitted as its expected value is assumed zero. Such linear
approximations to the expectations function allow the model to be simulated. Our
purpose in reviewing this technique is rather different though. It is to reveal the
general relationship between the expectations function and the weakly exogenous
variables x as shown in (10).
The approach we take using a large econometric model is in this spirit. First, every
variable in the model is shocked and its effect on the value of the expected series we
are interested in calculated. From this information one can determine which variables
have the biggest effect on the future value of any particular series. Those variables
that have the largest effect are then put into the learning rule. This information isECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 14
comparable to the first-order term in the Collard and  Juillard framework (10).
However, it does not take into account any possible co-movement between the series
included in the rule and it may be that two of the series contain essentially the same
information (see below). To capture this co-movement two approaches are taken.
First, the correlation matrix is calculated. This measures the extent to which any two
series move together and would seem to capture the relationship expressed in the
cross-derivatives expression in (10). If two series are highly correlated then the
marginal contribution from including more than one of the two series in the rule is
minor. Second, principal components analysis is used and those variables that are
most correlated with the components are then included in the rule. Again, it would
appear to make little sense including two variables in a rule that are both highly
correlated with a particular principal component. Both these approaches might be
expected to lead to a reduction in the size of the set of variables that are candidates for
inclusion in the learning rule.
4 The Model
The above analysis is conducted on a medium sized econometric model of the
aggregate Euro-11 economy (i.e. a model of those eleven countries that will be the
inaugural members of European Monetary Union). Expectations can enter these
models in many areas, but it is in the exchange rate sector where they have been
shown to have the largest effect. Typically expectations have been introduced via a
forward-looking open arbitrage real exchange rate equation,
t t t t t r e e E e + - + = - + - 1 1 1 ) 1 ( a a (11)
where e is the log of the real Euro/Dollar exchange rate and r is the real interest rate
differential between short-term rates in Euroland and the United States (a proxy for




j t t t Y e E -
=
+ - ￿ + =
1
1 1 1 g g (12)
where there are k series included in the learning rule
1. With time-varying parameters
some process that can recursively update them needs formalizing. Here it is assumed
that agents update their expectations each period by using the  Kalman Filter, an
extremely general tool in which the updating techniques used by other authors (e.g.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 15
OLS) can be nested. To describe the conceptual framework take the following set of n
equations as summarizing a large non-linear macro model,
) , , ( 1 + = it t it it i it Y E X Y F Y i=1,…,n, and t=1,…,T. (13)
where Y is a vector of current and lagged values of the n endogenous variables, X is a
vector of exogenous variables and E tYt+1 is the current period’s expectation of next
period’s Y. It is assumed that agents have the following perceived law of motion for
the endogenous variables,
t t t t t Z D Y E 1 1 e + = + å1t ~ N(0,W) (14)
where D is the time-varying matrix of parameters, Z is the information set consisting
of all the current and lagged values of Y and X. The parameters evolve as,
t t t D D 2 1 e + = - å2t ~ N(0,Q) (15)
It is the relative values of the Q and W matrices that determine the change in the
parameters. Though in large-scale models, and unlike small analytical models, all
error comes from the complexity of the model (e1), and not from stochastic terms in
the model itself (e2). In Kalman Filter terminology, (14) is the measurement equation,
(15) is the state equation and W and Q the matrices of hyper-parameters.
5 Empirical Results
In this section the empirical results are presented. First, each of the series in the model
are shocked and their effect on real exchange rates calculated. Those series with the
biggest effect are then included in the learning rule. Second, correlations between the
exchange rate and the rest of the series are calculated for a moving window of four
quarters; with those series that display the most consistent correlations included in the
rule. Finally, principal components analysis is conducted, and those series that are
most closely linked with each component are chosen to enter the rule.
Multi-Shocks
Each of the series (at every lag that they enter the model) are shocked and their effect
on the expected value of next period’s exchange rate calculated. Initially each of the
series was shocked by a fixed per cent, as if a derivative was being calculated. But
one drawback with this is that it doesn’t take account of the extent to which some
                                                                                                                                           
1 No currently dated variables are used to form expectations since including the current exchange rate
would be close to assuming that the exchange rate is determined by itself.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 16
series are more variable than others. As an example consider the behaviour of interest
rates. They have varied relatively little so imposing a large change on them would
have a huge impact upon the exchange rate. To compensate for this we take the size
of the shock to be equal to the size of the series’ historical deviation from trend. Table
1 presents the four best and four worst performing series.
The best performing series are nominal wage earnings and import prices, both their
current values and their value lagged one quarter. One problem that may arise is the
extent to which the current values of these series are known when the expectations are
being formed, it is perhaps more usual to think of there being a time lag before the
data become available. Similarly should a lagged dependent variable be included?
Three possible combinations of these series for the learning rules are considered:
Rule 1: 1 2 1 - + = t t t e e g g (16)
Rule 2: 1 3 1 2 1 - - + + = t t t t t W e e g g g (17)
Rule 3: 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 - - - + + + = t t t t t t t PM W e e g g g g (18)
Note that each of the rules also includes a constant. To analyse the performance of
these rules, government consumption in the model is shocked by one per cent in the
initial period (1988 quarter 2) only. The resulting difference between the expected
exchange rate and the actual exchange rate is then calculated, with the difference
between these series adjusted to remove any negative signs. A time path is then
created for the reported statistic (V) that measures this difference relative to next



















This statistic captures the cumulative size of the forecast errors. Every simulation of
the model then creates this variable so that it can be observed evolving over time. The
value for V that is reported is its size at the end of the simulation period, here 2048
quarter four. Note that in a rational expectations model Vt is zero each period since
the expected exchange rate can never deviate from the actual exchange rate. Clearly a
“good” rule should be the one that has a small value for this term, relative to the other
rules.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 17
Kalman filter estimation requires choosing the initial value for the covariance matrix,
plus the ratio of the error terms from the measurement and state equations. In a well-
defined problem, estimation results are robust to the chosen initial values for the
covariance matrix though not to the chosen value for the ratio of the error terms, as
one might expect. Given the importance of this ratio, results are reported for a broad
range of initial values, varying from very large numbers (i.e. 1000) to very small ones
(i.e. 0.0001). The larger the number the more that the coefficients on the variables
included in the rule are allowed to vary over time.
Figure 1 plots the cumulative forecast error for rules 1 to 3. The shape of the rules,
and the magnitude of their deviation from the RE solution (i.e. 0) are similar in each
case. For bigger values of the ratio of the error terms (termed CE in the figure), the
resulting value for V is approximately invariant. All three rules then have a larger
cumulative forecast error as the parameters on the variables in the learning rule are
forced to vary less. As the ratio of error terms is further reduced the three learning
rules move back towards convergence to the RE equilibrium
2. It is surprising that the
performance of these three rules is so similar. The rule that one might expect to
perform best since it includes more information, Rule 3, does not perform any better
than the other two rules. There is also some crossover between the rules, that is for
certain values of the ratio of errors one rule has the smallest value of cumulative
errors, and for other values for this ratio, a different rule performs better. The message
seems to be that the simplest rule that includes only lagged exchange rates performs
as well as the rules that include nominal wages and import prices. The marginal
contribution of both of these series is extremely minor. This is true across a wide
range of rules which are not reported here in detail given space constraints
To demonstrate the wide similarity in the model outcomes for different rules we will
give details of three other rules which included only “unimportant” variables, that is
those variables which, when shocked, had the least impact upon the real exchange
rate.
Rule 4: 1 2 1 - + = t t t PGC e g g (19)
                                                
2 We experimented with reducing the ratio of error terms even more but the rules appeared to diverge
once this ratio is reduced even more.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 18
Rule 5: 2 2 1 - + = t t t RSH e g g (20)
Rule 6: 2 2 1 - + = t t t C e g g (21)
Rule 4 includes only a constant and the price of government consumption (PGC), rule
5 has short-term interest rates (RSH) lagged two quarters and a constant, and rule 6
has a constant with consumption (C) also lagged two periods. Figure 2 plots their
responses following the government expenditure shock. There are clearly large
differences between these three rules. Rule 2, which includes only the short-term
interest rate performs much worse than any of the other rules. Its cumulative forecast
error term is larger than the corresponding term for any other term by an order of
magnitude. Neither the magnitude nor shapes of the other two rules’ cumulative error
terms are markedly different from those obtained under the “important” rules (rules
1–3).
A comparison of rules 1 to 6 shows that differentiating the series on the basis of their
effect on the real exchange rate does not lead to a clear difference in the performance
of the rules. Three of the rules should perform much worse than the other three but it
is only rule 5 that is noticeably different. There are two explanations for this
performance. It could be that the  Kalman filter is simply extremely effective at
extracting the information necessary for forecasting a variable and that learning does
indeed give rise to a very similar outcome over a very wide information set. It will
therefore matter little which series is included in the learning rule, except for those
variables that are totally unrelated to the real exchange rate. Alternatively, it could be
that the criterion chosen to rank the series is not the optimal one. To explore this
second issue alternative ranking methods are explored. First, a correlation matrix
(between the exchange rate and the rest of the series) is constructed and then the
series are ranked according to which series are most strongly correlated with the
exchange rate. Second, principal component analysis is carried. Here the series chosen
for inclusion in the learning rule are those variables that contain most of the
information that is in these components. Both these methods have the added
advantage that the inter-relationships between the series can be assessed. This enables
the ideas in Collard and Juillard to be introduced.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 19
To capture the extent to which two series co-vary, a simple correlation matrix seems
sufficient. But calculating the correlation between two series over the entire sample
period is uninformative for two reasons. First, the degree of correlation can vary over
time. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the information we are interested in is
the usefulness of one series for forecasting another. For these reasons a rolling
correlation was chosen. That is, for each quarter the correlation between the four
previous values of a series with the current and three previous values of the real
exchange rate was calculated. This resulted in a time series for each of the series’
correlations and enabled us to calculate the standard deviations (SDs) for these series.
The correlations were then ranked according to which had the lowest SD, since a
smaller SD indicates that the series is consistently correlated with the exchange rate.
Results for the best and worst performing series are shown in Table 2. The four best
performing series are investment (IF), employment (ET), unemployment (UP) and the
real wage (W/P), in that order. The four worst are the capital stock (K), the consumer
price deflator (PC), consumption (C) and real personal net wealth (RPNW). A
comparison of Tables 1 and 2 indicate that there is very little consistency between
these two methods of choosing which series should enter the learning rules. Only
consumption is a consistently poor performer. Figure 3 plots two learning rules
3, one
that includes only investment (i.e. the best performing rule according to this
correlation exercise) and one that includes only the capital stock (i.e. the rule that
should perform the worst).
Rule 7: 1 2 1 - + = t t t IF e g g (22)
Rule 8: 1 2 1 - + = t t t K e g g (23)
The results indicate that the two rules in fact perform remarkably alike in terms of
their shape and the size of their deviation from the RE equilibrium. Except for two of
the chosen ratio of error terms, the “best” rule that includes investment also
outperforms the “worst” rule, which includes the capital stock. These differences are
minor however, suggesting that selecting series according to their correlation with the
exchange rate utilising a moving window is also not a satisfactory criterion. Series
that have little correlation with the exchange rate perform equally as well as those that
are highly correlated.
                                                
3 Again the series plotted are the deviations from the RE path for the real exchange rate.
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Principal Components Analysis
One problem with including two series in a learning rule is not knowing the extent to
which the series may contain essentially the same information. One advantage in
assuming learning is that it assumes the agent may be limited in the amount of
information available. Because of this it seems natural that the learning rule should be
as simple as possible with a simple rule being preferred to a more complicated one.
Including series that overlap in the amount of information that they contain for
forecasting exchange rates is inefficient, and a situation the agent presumably wishes
to avoid. This is the essence of Collard and Juillard’s argument and motivates the use
here of principle components analysis. The idea is to identify the principle
components from all the series in the system, and include only those variables that
most closely move with the components. Tables 3a and 3b show the results. Table 3a
indicates that 58% of all the variation in each of the series can be explained by just
two of the components. Given our requirement that the rules should be simple, it
seems preferable to concentrate on selecting those two series that contain the
information that is in these two components. Table 3b shows that employment and
unemployment contain 94% of the information that is contained in the first principal
component. This is a good illustration of the point that it is the second moment that
we should be interested in, and not only the first. There seems little point in including
both these series in any rule since, with a given workforce, they are perfectly
negatively correlated with each other: as unemployment increases employment
decreases, and vice versa. We therefore take the employment series as capturing the
first component, with total imports being the series that most closely captures
component two.
Rule 9: 1 3 1 2 1 - - + + = t t t t t PM ET e g g g (24)
Figure 4 plots the measure of the cumulative forecast errors from this rule, together
with the best rule from the moving-window correlation exercise above. Despite these
arguments for the use of principal components, there is little quantitative difference
between the results from the two rules and from the rules graphed in Figures 3 and 4.
6 Using a Simple Learning Rule as the Benchmark
All of the above results assessed a given rule by comparing the exchange rate’s path
following a shock to the path that would have been obtained under RE. This is notECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 21
necessarily the best way of measuring the efficiency of a rule. So here we ask how
successful the rules are using a simple learning rule as the benchmark. The benchmark
rule simply includes lagged real exchange rates (i.e. Rule 1). To assess which series
should be included in the rules a correlation exercise is conducted, as above. The
series are then ranked according to how consistently they track the exchange rate’s
path from Rule 1. The best performing series is relative wage costs (WCR).
Rule 10: 1 2 1 - + = t t t WCR e g g (25)
Figure 5 plots this rule and compares it to the simplified rule. As the figure shows, the
two plots are virtually indistinguishable.
The conclusion from all these exercises seems to be very clear. For a very wide range
of information sets the models properties are practically identical and quite different
from the RE solution. We have to move to very poor rules to get any results, which
are substantially different from the main cluster of results, and when this does occur
the results are generally so poor that the model is clearly not converging in the long
run to an expectations equilibria. So any rule which converges on  an expectations
equilibria seems to give very similar results.
7 Effect of Varying the Degree of Rationality
The natural next  question that can be asked is how much rationality is needed in the
learning rule for the results to converge to those from a model that assumes rational
expectations. The above results show that varying the particular form of the learning
rule has little effect on the model’s properties. But it may be that there is a big
divergence between the properties of the model obtained from the above simulations
relative to those from an RE model. To test this the following rule for expectations
was assumed,
1 1 1 ) 1 ( + + + - + = t LEt t REt t t e E e E e E a a (26)
where E REtet+1 is the expected exchange rate assuming rational expectations, E LEtet+1
the expected exchange rate assuming learning and where the parameter a is varied
from 0 to 1. The assumed learning rule is Rule 3 (expected exchange rates are
assumed to be determined by the actual exchange rate, earnings and import prices, all
lagged one quarter) so clearly if a is set to zero then the model behaves exactly as
described above and shown in Figure 1. Alternatively if a is set to one then the modelECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 22
behaves exactly as if all expectations are rational and the expectations error is zero, up
to a white noise error term. Figure 6 presents the results from two experiments. In the
first one a is set to 0.1 implying that there is very little rationality in the assumed
form of the learning rule, in the second experiment a is set to 0.9, implying that it is
rational expectations that are driving the results. The figure shows however that there
are only minor differences between the two simulations. Remember, full RE would
imply a straight line of zero in this graph, so just introducing 10% of learning
behaviour into the expectations rule moves us almost all the way from the RE solution
into the cluster of outcomes that all the learning results inhabit. This strongly suggests
that there is a qualitative difference between the full RE outcome and any near RE
solution. Any small departure from RE quickly shifts the models properties from the
RE ones into something much more representative of the wide body of outcomes
which may occur under many near rational learning schemes.
8  Conclusion
This paper set out to ask two basic questions; How should agents select the learning
rule which they may use and does their choice have a substantial effect on the
properties of an economic model. Second, does the full RE assumption lead to a
reasonable approximation of the models properties under a wide range of near rational
expectations formation procedures. If it does then the analytical attractiveness of this
simple assumption undoubtedly suggests that RE is a sound basic assumption to
employ in economic analysis. If it does not however then it throws serious dobt on the
use of the full RE assumption in macroeconomic analysis.
Three methods for choosing the series that should enter the learning rule have been
assessed. Except for the very worse rules, the results appear to be robust to the chosen
form of the learning rule. One conclusion seems to be that learning is able to extract
information from any series so well that the exact form of the rule is not important.
However while a very wide range of rules give almost identical answers they all differ
substantially from the RE solution. To further check that this is not simply the result
of the particular learning process being used we set op a weighted expectations
scheme which allowed us to combine full RE expectations with a learning solution.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 23
We demonstrated that very small departures from full RE (less than 10%) moved the
models properties most of the way from the RE solution to the learning solution
properties. This strongly suggests that RE is does not give rise to representative model
properties and that if, in fact, real agents have only very small departures from
rationality the RE assumption will not be a good approximation to their behaviour.ECB • Working Paper No 86 • November 2001 24
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Series Component 1 Component 2 Component 3 Component 4
RRX 0.39 0.48 0.40 0.24
WCR 0.23 0.57 0.36 0.31
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X -0.67 -0.37 0.06 -0.16
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INF -0.03 -0.15 0.81 -0.13
RSH -0.29 -0.45 0.73 0.14
IF -0.64 0.15 -0.13 0.48
ET -0.94 -0.07 -0.02 0.02
UP 0.94 0.08 0.02 -0.02
NRR -0.45 -0.57 0.42 0.15
UWC 0.89 -0.12 0.09 -0.05
GDP -0.88 -0.15 -0.15 0.02
ER 0.91 -0.11 0.09 -0.10
C -0.62 0.14 0.18 -0.02
K -0.36 0.27 0.12 -0.69
RX -0.77 0.36 0.16 -0.22
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